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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SAVAGE INDUSTRIES, INC, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
Appeal No. 900248 
Priority #15 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER SAVAGE INDUSTRIES, INC. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case comes before this Court on appeal from a decision of the Utah State 
Tax Commission issued April 20, 1990, disallowing the use of certain net operating loss 
carry-forwards of Western Rock Products Corp. (hereinafter "Western Rock") and KNT 
Leasing Corporation (hereinafter "KNT1). 
The facts in this case are stipulated. The sole issue of law presented to this 
Court on appeal, is the proper interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-108. 
Respondent additionally in its brief raised a question regarding the appropriate 
standard of review of an administrative agency's interpretation of the law where no issues 
of fact are present. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THIS 
CASE IS THE "CORRECTION-OF-ERROR-
STANDARD". 
Because this proceeding was commenced after January 1, 1988, the scope of this 
Court's review of the Tax Commission's order is governed by § 63-46b-16(4) of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). Under the relevant portion of § 63-46b-
16(4)(d) (1989), this Court can grant relief to Petitioner if the Tax Commission 
"erroneously interpreted" the law to Petitioner's substantial prejudice. Bevans v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 790 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah App. 1990). While both 
Petitioner and Respondent agree that this section is the governing standard in this case, 
there is a clear dispute as to what this section sets forth as the standard. 
The Tax Commission, without the support of any cited authority, purports that 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(d) requires this Court to give deference to the statutory interpretation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-108 made by the Tax Commission. This erroneous conclusion 
is drawn by the Tax Commission on the basis of the requirement in the statute that a 
finding of substantial prejudice to the Petitioner must be shown. The requirement of 
substantial prejudice, however, goes not to the question of what deference should be 
placed on the interpretation of the Tax Commission, rather it goes to the damage 
caused by the Tax Commission's erroneous interpretation. 
In the present case, the erroneous interpretation of the statute by the Tax 
Commission results in the loss of hundreds of thousands of dollars of net operating loss 
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carry-forwards to KNT and Western Rock. The effect of the determination made by the 
Tax Commission forever bars the utilization of these losses by these corporations. This 
is clearly substantial prejudice. Therefore, the requirements of the statute are met. 
Prior to the passage of the UAPA, the appropriate standard of review in agency 
decisions involving statutory interpretation with no disputed facts was the "correction-
of-error-standard". Hurley v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 767 P.2d 524 
(Utah 1988). In 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that the standard was 
unchanged by the UAPA. 
We conclude that, under § 63-46b-16(4)(d) of the UAPA, it 
is still appropriate for a court to review an agency's inter-
pretation of statutorily granted powers and authority as a 
question, with no deference to the agent's view of the law. 
We therefore will apply the correction-of-error-standard to 
such an issue and uphold the Commission's statutory inter-
pretation only if we conclude it is not erroneous. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Bevans v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah App. 1990). 
Because the Petitioner has been substantially affected by the erroneous interpreta-
tion of the statute by the Tax Commission, it is entitled to a review of that decision by 
this Court. The correct standard of review of that decision is the correction-of-error-
standard as was dispositively decided in Bevans. 
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II. THE TAX COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-7-108 IS CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
Both the Petitioner and the Respondent agree that the first test in analyzing the 
statute is to look at the plain language of the statute. (See Respondent's Brief, pp. 8-
9.) Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-108(14)(f) states: 
Corporations acquiring the assets or stock of another 
corporation may not deduct any net loss of the acquired 
corporation incurred prior to the date of acquisition. 
[Emphasis added.] 
In this case, the acquiring corporation was Savage Industries, Inc. and the acquired 
corporations were KNT and Western Rock. The statute in question provides only for 
a restriction of the use of net operating losses by an acquiring corporation. The 
corporations seeking to use the net operating losses are not the acquiring corporation 
but the acquired corporations. By its plain and unambiguous language therefor, the 
statute does not prohibit the actions of the taxpayers in this case. 
In Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806 (Utah 1988) this court 
found: 
Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this court 
will not look beyond to divine legislative intent. Instead, we 
are guided by the rule that a statute should be construed 
according to its plain language. 
Allisen at 809. Since the statutory language here is plain and unambiguous, the net 
operating losses of KNT and Western Rock should be deductible against their own 
income. 
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The Tax Commission attempts to circumvent the plain language of the statute by 
asserting that under Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-124 and Rule 865-6-4F of the Utah 
Administrative Code, the income of the consolidated group is equivalent to the income 
of the parent corporation, Savage Industries. Therefore, any reduction in the income 
of the consolidated group would be a reduction in the income of Savage Industries, Inc. 
and is proscribed by the statute. This torturous interpretation has no support in the 
cited statutory provisions or rules. 
Initially, it should be pointed out that there is no cross reference or any other 
reference indicating that the provisions of § 59-7-108 are to be read in conjunction with 
those of § 59-7-124. However, even if there were some connection between the two 
sections, it should be pointed out that R 865-6-4F makes it very clear that each 
corporation is a separate legal entity in spite of the fact that they file a consolidated tax 
return. The specific provision setting forth the methodology by which income for the 
consolidated group is determined is R 865-6-4F(J). The pertinent portion of this 
provision states "consolidated net income is the aggregate of the gross income of each 
of the includable corporations less the aggregate of the allowable deductions of each of 
such corporations." Subsection 3 of R 865-6-4F(J) requires separate schedules for each 
corporation included in the affiliated group setting forth that corporation's own income 
and deductions. It is clear that while only one tax return is filed, separate income and 
loss is computed for each corporation in order to create this one tax return. It is also 
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clear that this tax return is not the tax return of the parent corporation but of a new 
entity known as the affiliated group. 
The fact that each corporation maintains its separate identity is even more clearly 
set forth in R 865-6-4F(G) which provides 'The parent corporation is the agent for each 
corporation included in the affiliated group with respect to the tax for the taxable year 
for which a consolidated return is made or required." Subsection G also provides that 
if the parent corporation dissolves or is contemplating dissolution that the group can 
appoint a new agent. This clearly demonstrates that the group has a life and existence 
outside that of the parent corporation. 
Because each corporation maintains its separate identity within the affiliated 
group, the only time a net operating loss could be improperly used by the parent 
corporation within the affiliated group is where the net operating loss of the acquired 
corporation is used to offset income of the parent corporation or one of the other 
subsidiaries. That is not the case that is before this Court. The case before this Court 
is where the acquired corporations are merely offsetting their income with their own net 
operating losses. The income from the acquiring corporation, the parent, is unaffected 
by the use of the loss of the acquired corporations. 
It is a basic premise of statutory construction that the legislature uses the terms 
that it does advisedly. Board of Education of the Granite School District v. Salt Lake 
County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983); Chris & Dicks Lumber v. Tax Commission, 791 
P.2d 511, 514 (Utah 1990). Had the legislature wished to eliminate all future uses of 
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net operating losses by acquired corporations, they could have done so by simply writing 
a statute to eliminate the net operating losses of acquired corporations. The legislature 
did not choose to so do. Instead, they chose to only restrict the use of net operating 
losses by acquiring corporations. 
III. THE TAX COMMISSIONS INTERPRETATION 
WOULD PROMOTE FORM OVER SUBSTANCE. 
The Tax Commission's final argument is that following the plain language of the 
statute would allow the parent corporation to improperly acquire and manipulate loss 
corporations. This argument suffers from a number of deficiencies. The first deficiency 
is the assumption stated as "no longer must subsidiary corporations carry their losses 
until they have sufficient income to offset." (Respondent's Brief at p. 12.) If the Tax 
Commission is referring to the fact that under a consolidated scheme, post-acquisition 
losses of the subsidiaries can be used to offset post-acquisition gains of a parent 
corporation, that is true. However, there is nothing even slightly improper about such 
a scheme as it is clearly endorsed by § 59-7-124. Adopting the interpretation of the Tax 
Commission in this case would not affect the ability of a subsidiary corporation to offset 
its current losses against a parent company's current income and therefore the distinction 
is meaningless. 
If the meaning of the Tax Commission's argument is that somehow by enforcing 
the clear language of the statute, a parent company will be able to use a preacquisition 
net operating loss to offset the parent company's current income, that is clearly wrong. 
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The interpretation espoused by the Petitioner, which is set forth in the plain language 
of the statute, is that an acquired corporation may offset its preacquisition losses against 
its own post acquisition income. The parent company is not involved and, the net 
operating loss of the subsidiary is never used to offset the income of the parent 
corporation. 
The next concern expressed by the Tax Commission is also misplaced. The Tax 
Commission poses the hypothetical that a corporation could acquire a loss corporation 
and transfer some of the profitable operations from either itself or another subsidiary to 
the loss corporation, thus enabling the pre-acquisition loss to be utilized on a con-
solidated return. (Respondents Brief at 13.) The basic problems with this argument 
are that (1) they are inapplicable to the current fact situation, and (2) such an inter-
pretation would still not preclude a manipulation of the statute to bring about the 
utilization of a net operating loss by an acquiring corporation. 
The argument is inapplicable in this case because there was no transfer of 
operations from either the parent or another subsidiary to the acquired corporations. It 
is further inappropriate because those individuals who owned the acquired corporation, 
prior to acquisition, are essentially the same individuals who owned the acquired 
corporations after the acquisition. The so called "acquisition" was in reality a mere 
consolidation of the various corporations owned by the Savage Brothers. In this case, 
there has been no "artful" purchase of a loss corporation for purposes of acquiring net 
operating losses. 
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The "manipulation" allowing profitable corporations to utilize the NOL's of an 
"acquired" corporation is just as available under the Tax Commission's interpretation of 
the statute as under Petitioner's interpretation. In order to accomplish such a "manipul-
ation". Savage Industries could have had KNT or Western Rock "purchase" Savage 
Industries or one of the profitable subsidiaries. In this manner, the "acquired" corpora-
tion would not have any NOL's, rather they would belong to the acquiring corporation. 
Therefore, the profitable operations of one or more subs could have been used to offset 
the NOL's of either KNT or Western Rock. 
To adopt the Tax Commission's proposed definition would be to uphold form 
over substance by stating that a company could manipulate the application of the statute 
solely by reversing the corporation that was to be the surviving corporation in the 
transaction. After such transaction had taken place, the surviving corporation could even 
change its name to that of the acquired corporation. The net result is the very 
"manipulation" the Tax Commission fears. Petitioner eschewed such a manipulation in 
this case. It does not seek to offset the NOL's of the loss corporations against the 
income of profitable corporations. 
Petitioner seeks only to uphold the plain language of the statute and allow the 
corporation who incurred the losses to use their own income to offset them. Because 
the interpretation proposed by the Tax Commission completely elevates form over 
substance, ignores the plain language of the statute, and does not seriously address any 
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of the policy concerns raised by the Tax Commission, the Tax Commission's interpreta-
tion of the statute should be rejected and the Tax Commission's holding reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The parties have stipulated to the facts. The parties also agree that the plain, 
unambiguous language of the statute should be the controlling factor in that statute's 
interpretation. The question therefore becomes, what does the plain language say? A 
reading of the statute in its entirety demonstrates beyond question that the interpretation 
of the Tax Commission is insupportable in law. Because the facts of this case and the 
law clearly demonstrate that the deductions claimed by the Petitioner were proper, the 
holding of the Tax Commission should be reversed. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that this Court must reverse the order of the 
Tax Commission entered April 20, 1990, and grant Petitioner's refund as set forth in its 
Petition for Redetermination. 
DATED this / f # day of January, 1991. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
^l~ 7f). 
Dale R. Kent 
R. Bret Jenkins 
Shawn D. Turner 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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